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The now taken-for-granted notion that data lead to information, which leads to knowledge, which in turn 
leads to wisdom was first specified in detail by R. L. Ackoff in 1988. The Data-Information-Knowledge-
Wisdom hierarchy is based on filtration, reduction, and transformation. Besides being causal and hierarchical, 
the scheme is pyramidal, in that data are plentiful while wisdom is almost nonexistent. Ackoff’s formula 
linking these terms together this way permits us to ask what the opposite of knowledge is and whether 
analogous principles of hierarchy, process, and pyramiding apply to it. The inversion of the Data-
Information-Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy produces a series of opposing terms (including misinformation, 
error, ignorance, and stupidity) but not exactly a chain or a pyramid. Examining the connections between 
these phenomena contributes to our understanding of the contours and limits of knowledge.  
 
This presentation will revisit the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy 
linking these concepts together as stages of a single developmental process, with the 
aim of building a taxonomy for a postulated opposite of knowledge, which I will call 
‘nonknowledge’. 
Concepts of data, information, knowledge, and wisdom are the building blocks of 
library and information science. Discussions and definitions of these terms pervade the 
literature from introductory textbooks to theoretical research articles (see Zins, 2007).  
Expressions linking some of these concepts predate the development of information 
science as a field of study (Sharma 2008). But the first to put all the terms into a single 
formula was Russell Lincoln Ackoff, in 1989. 
Ackoff posited a hierarchy at the top of which lay wisdom, and below that 
understanding, knowledge, information, and data, in that order. Furthermore, he wrote 
that “each of these includes the categories that fall below it,” and estimated that “on 
average about forty percent of the human mind consists of data, thirty percent 
information, twenty percent knowledge, ten percent understanding, and virtually no 
wisdom” (Ackoff, 1989, 3). This phraseology allows us to view his model as a 
pyramid, and indeed it has been likened to one ever since (Rowley, 2007; see figure 1). 
(‘Understanding’ is omitted, since subsequent formulations have not picked up on it.)  
 Ackoff was a management consultant and former professor of management science 
at the Wharton School specializing in operations research and organizational theory.  
His article formulating what is now commonly called the Data-Information-
Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy (or DIKW for short) was first given in 1988 as a 
presidential address to the International Society for General Systems Research.  This 
background may help explain his approach.  Data in his terms are the product of 
observations, and are of no value until they are processed into a usable form to become 
information.  Information is contained in answers to questions.  Knowledge, the next 
layer, further refines information by making “possible the transformation of 
information into instructions.  It makes control of a system possible” (Ackoff, 1989, 4), 
and that enables one to make it work efficiently.  A managerial rather than scholarly 
perspective runs through Ackoff’s entire hierarchy, so that “understanding” for him 
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connotes an ability to assess and correct for errors, while “wisdom” means an ability to 
see the long-term consequences of any act and evaluate them relative to the ideal of 
total control (omnicompetence). While a scholarly perspective on this hierarchy might 
prioritize the processes of inquiry and discovery, Ackoff does not account for them.  
But his concept of omnicompetence, which refers to “the ability to satisfy any and 
every desire” (Ackoff, 1989, 8), does encompass the satisfaction of user-defined needs.  
 
 Figure 1. The Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy as a pyramid 
 
                   
 
 
In creating his hierarchy, Ackoff focused only on specific modes of data, 
information, knowledge, and wisdom, and neglected important distinctions observed by 
information scientists such as Buckland (1991), Machlup (1980), and Soergel (1985).  
Clearly his model was directed primarily to the management of organizations and only 
incidentally, if at all, to bibliographic materials and collections. But the notion of 
interconnecting these phenomena as processes leading from raw data to wisdom 
through filtration, reduction, and refinement created a powerful image of great value in 
library and information science instruction and reflection for further research, shedding 
light on the very nature of knowledge.  In designing and managing systems to organize 
information resources for retrieval we would like to know how data are transformed 
into more complex phenomena. The hierarchy can also be used in reverse to see how an 
example of wisdom was derived from phenomena at a lower level.  With managerial 
astuteness, Ackoff understood progression through the hierarchy to proceed on the 
basis of increasing control. Crucially, Ackoff did not end his schema with knowledge 
but went further to tie the entire system together with wisdom, an ideal state, at the 
pinnacle. 
Despite objections that the model glosses over the various different kinds of data, 
information, knowledge, and wisdom, this hierarchical and pyramidal model captures 
certain insights useful not only to personnel and organizational management but to the 
organization of library resources.  By providing a model of the ontology and structure 
of knowledge it has become canonical to the field of knowledge organization. 
As a case study of how the DIKW hierarchy can shed light on problems in 
knowledge organization, I want to use it as background and starting point for reflecting 
 70 
on the opposite of knowledge.  Looking at the way DIKW decomposes a sequence of 
levels surrounding knowledge invites us to wonder if an analogous sequence of stages 
surrounds ignorance, and where associated phenomena like credulity and 
misinformation fit.  These concepts need to be understood in the context of knowledge 
organization.  Besides psychological and sociological aspects, we would want to know 
how the opposite of knowledge coheres conceptually, whether it constitutes a domain, 
and how it is organized and positioned in knowledge organization systems. 
Why would we want to know what the opposite of knowledge is? Ignorance, 
misinformation, stupidity, and so forth do have discourses about them and it would be 
useful to discover their underlying interrelations. They are also a part of culture.  
Popular arts such as film and literature, as well as traditional folklore, all engage with 
ignorance, stupidity, and error.  Furthermore, a theory of the opposite of knowledge in 
bibliography tests the boundaries of our concepts about knowledge.  An investigation 
toward such a theory asks, in effect, what, if anything, resides outside the universe of 
documentary knowledge, how would we describe it, how would be gain access to it, 
how should we organize it in libraries, and how, if at all, should it be identified to 
distinguish it from valid knowledge.   
To identify the negative counterparts to the terms in the Data-Information-
Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy we might start by simply finding common antonyms for 
each term. This produces the following results:  
 
 Data  Absence or want of data; missing data 
 Information Misinformation; disinformation; error 
 Knowledge Ignorance 
 Wisdom  Folly; stupidity 
 
Notice there is no single term for the opposite of data. Nevertheless, the idea of a 
want of data or a gap in data does cohere as a comprehensible concept, and could be a 
topic of writing. Frické (2009), for one, argues that for data to be data they must be 
true, and that mistaken data are not data at all. This suggests that the notion of an 
opposite of data is a logical possibility.   
For ‘information’ we find several different opposites. An error is a mistake made 
inadvertently or in ignorance, while misinformation is wrong information or a false 
account of intelligence received, and disinformation is the deliberate dissemination of 
false information with the intention of influencing the opinions and even policies of 
those receiving it. These concepts suggest a continuum from error to disinformation 
based on one’s state of awareness, volition, and culpability.   
Unlike the other terms in this schema, ‘knowledge’ has an obvious single opposite, 
namely ‘ignorance.’ But knowledge itself is highly slippery concept, since it is 
culturally and linguistically relative and can be made obsolete. Just as there are many 
kinds of knowledge, there may be many kinds of ignorance. 
‘Wisdom’ yields two antonyms in the English language, ‘stupidity’ and ‘folly’.  
Although the terms do not completely overlap in meaning, they do seem on initial 
examination to be interchangeable in some senses, except that ‘stupidity’ connotes lack 
of intelligence, or mental capacity, as well as lack (and indeed the inverse) of wisdom.  
Although most psychologists and other writers have long taken care to distinguish 
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stupidity from mental disability, the actual meaning of stupidity is not sharply defined 
in relation to folly. Ackoff himself (1989, 5) took into account the critical role of 
intelligence in knowledge systems when he defined it as “the ability to acquire 
knowledge on one’s own.”     
Emerging from the above analysis is a separation of error and folly, with folly being 
a more entrenched form of compounded errors, just as wisdom involves the synthesis 
or compounding of knowledge. But ultimately I reject my own hypothesis that the 
opposites of data, information, knowledge, and wisdom form a series mirroring DIKW.  
Errors can ensue even with the presence of accurate data or information, through 
misinterpretation or unsound reasoning, and misinformation and disinformation 
proceed not from a want of data but from distorting or incorrectly communicating 
information or knowledge, including information and knowledge that is correctly 
understood at the source. These hazards, and probably others, can intervene at different 
points in the development from data towards wisdom. 
Nevertheless, the various phenomena I have identified as contrary to knowledge do 
seem to cohere as some kind of category. At this point I want to use the word 
nonknowledge, literally meaning “want of knowledge,” and extend it to cover this 
entire spectrum from absence of data to stupidity and beyond. Given that knowledge is 
understood through DIKW to be connected in a system of interconnected and verbally 
identified phases representing different levels of complexity, synthesis, and refinement, 
there is a need for a concept that unites all the negative counterparts to these processes 
and phenomena. Just as DIKW does not only posit a hierarchy but explores the 
relations between data, information, knowledge, and wisdom, I would like to examine 
relations between phenomena on the negative side. 
As might be expected, the literatures on error, stupidity, folly, misconceptions, and 
ignorance are disconnected. Some of these subjects appear to have undergone minor 
reawakened interest. At least three serious books on stupidity have appeared in English 
since the year 2000: The Encyclopaedia of Stupidity by Matthijs van Boxsel (2003), 
Stupidity by Avital Ronell (2002), and Why Smart People can be so Stupid, edited by 
Robert J. Sternberg (2002). As indicated in the title of the latter book, the recent 
literature distinguishes stupidity from low I.Q. This distinction was blurred in some 
writings on the subject up until the 1950s. Even so, the exact meaning of stupidity is 
sometimes unclear, since various authors think it is something outside the boundaries 
of discourse and inquiry. Boxsel, in his Encyclopaedia of Stupidity (2003, 29), says that 
“Stupidity is unfathomable; it can only be defined negatively, by contrast with another 
quality or as a deficit.” This view, first expressed by the Austrian novelist Robert Musil 
(1990) in a 1937 lecture, sums up the paradox or riddle of conceptualizing stupidity. 
People point out what is stupid in others, but even when it is recognized in oneself, the 
stupidity of an action or phenomenon is only noticed in hindsight, and it does not seem 
to be a coherent quality in its own right. James F. Welles, author of the important but 
little-known and apparently self-published Understanding Stupidity (1986), suggests 
there is a taboo on examining stupidity, which he believes has shaped history far more 
than has knowledge or wisdom.  
Despite or perhaps because of the sense of imponderability and indefinableness 
expressed about stupidity, it is clear that attention to it has increased in recent years.  
The analysis of stupidity is slowly coming into focus as an intellectually coherent and 
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legitimate subject matter, even though it is still in its formative stage. Similarly, a new 
book called The Virtues of Ignorance, edited by Vitek and Jackson (2008), calls for a 
reappraisal of our culture’s knowledge-based worldview inspired by the enlightenment 
and a shift to a worldview that enables us to admit our almost total ignorance as a 
species. Postmodern theory, which posits that knowledge and rationality are coercive 
and hegemonic practices, helps open up a space for such subversive analyses. 
But while some of the recent literature on stupidity might have been sparked or 
flavored by postmodern epistemologies, Welles’s book, Understanding Stupidity, 
which is not cited by any other author, does not fit this description. Welles, whose 
academic background is in zoology, is alone in examining stupidity in and of itself 
rather than from the perspective of any individual discipline.  He defines stupidity in 
terms of maladaptive responses to change. In stupidity the response to changing 
conditions is either insufficient, due most likely to self-deception and the tendency to 
stick to known ways of thought behavior, or an overly drastic and radical response that 
is not informed by data.  The failure to recognize change that requires response arises 
from the tendency to insulate oneself from information about changes, which could 
help one devise an appropriate adaptive response. This analysis in terms of assessing 
information and using it to make an appropriate response and the ability to detect errors 
fits neatly with Ackoff’s (1989) view of knowledge as the means to control a situation 
for a desirable outcome.  The difference between stupidity and ignorance, for Welles, 
lies in the adaptiveness or functionality of not heeding available information. In 
ignorance, unlike stupidity, a socially and psychologically adaptive mechanism is at 
work blocking the unwanted information from penetrating the cognitive system. Only 
in stupidity does the failure to absorb and process information work against one’s best 
interest. 
Smithson (1989), who focuses on ignorance, makes a similar point without 
mentioning stupidity by positing “irrelevance” as one of the two categories of 
ignorance, along with error. Irrelevance means deciding that something is irrelevant 
based on untopicality, undecidability, or taboo. Disregarding information due to 
untopicality would be in Welles’s terms an adaptive filtering mechanism, whereas the 
shunning of information as taboo may well be maladaptive, in which case it would lead 
to stupidity.    
Folly has been mentioned along with stupidity as an antonym of wisdom. A quasi-
religious concept of the fool, portrayed as court-jesters and merry-makers, came to the 
fore in medieval Europe and was canonized as a theme in literature first in Sebastian 
Brant’s 1494 Ship of Fools by Sebastian Brant and then in 1511 by Desiderius Erasmus 
in The Praise of Folly. Despite the unserious depiction of fools, folly was identified as 
moral failure. This attribute helps us define it as a species of nonknowledge, since 
Ackoff specifically mentions morality as a key component in the development of 
knowledge toward a condition of wisdom.  
 The word ‘folly’ also has the modern connotations of fallacies and 
misunderstandings resulting in devastation and calamity. This sense of folly as “policy 
contrary to self-interest” is expounded upon by Barbara Tuchman in The March of 
Folly: from Troy to Vietnam (1984). A policy or decision may seem correct or sensible 
when it is made, and it only becomes apparent later, after the damage is done, that the 
decision or policy was misguided. Folly in this sense follows from errors. In Deadly 
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Decisions, Christopher Burns (2008) looks at the background of the sinking of the 
Titanic, the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, and other disasters, finding that 
in all cases warnings were ignored, system safeguards designed to alert operators about 
a crisis blocked or disguised real data, communication systems broke down, and blame 
and even error were denied and covered up by all parties. The literature on folly in this 
sense is cataloged with the Library of Congress Subject Heading ‘Error’ rather than 
‘Folly’, but it can be seen that folly proceeds from error and exacerbates it. The titles of 
other recent books also reveal this concept of folly, even though they are not assigned 
‘Folly’ as a subject heading: Profiles in Folly: History’s Worst Decisions and Why they 
Went Wrong by Alan Axelrod (2008) and How to Lose a Battle: Foolish Plans and 
Great Military Blunders by Bill Fawcett (2006). The study of error or folly in this sense 
would apply to ongoing crises such as global warming and the subprime mortgage 
debacle.  
A related species of nonknowledge is popular misconceptions arising from 
credulity. A classic in the field is Charles Mackay’s Extraordinary Popular Delusions 
and the Madness of Crowds, first published in 1841 and widely reprinted. The subject 
has been taken up most recently by Damian Thompson in Counterknowledge (2008), 
which covers creation science, alternative medicine, get rich quick schemes, alternative 
histories as evidenced in Afro-centric textbooks, and web sites promulgating 
conspiracy theories about the September 11 terrorist attacks. In many instances, 
counterknowledge begins with errors, but there is often awareness of untruthfulness if 
not outright deceptive intent in the dissemination of misinformation. Thompson 
identifies an entire “counterknowledge industry,” which includes authors and 
publishers, who value profits over other concerns. Nor can booksellers be counted on to 
distinguish science from pseudoscience, or history from pseudo-history. The products 
of the counterknowledge industry produces make their way into libraries, where 
materials are selected according to how they meet the community’s needs. As library 
materials, they must be cataloged according to their subject. Now counterknowledge 
can serve useful purposes in a library collection, but it can also spawn further 
misinformation and error. Therefore, the treatment of counterknowledge, or 
nonknowledge, in libraries and information services raises important problems and 
responsibilities (see Swan & Peattie 1989). 
Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the various areas of nonknowledge as 
a subject treated by writers from various disciplines and angles (history, psychology, 
etc.) and nonknowledge as content. The clearest examples of nonknowledge as the 
content rather than subject matter of documents are fraud (including forgery) and 
propaganda.  Fraud is a deliberate as opposed to inadvertent misrepresentation resulting 
in false conclusions conveyed by fabricating and distorting evidence. A claim of 
encountering the Loch Ness monster may honestly represent a person’s subjective 
experience or it may be a fantasy or tall tale, but creating or planting false evidence to 
back up such a claim is fraud.  Propaganda is the technique of influencing human 
action by the manipulation of representations to evoke a certain response. Recalling 
Ackoff’s point about knowledge being for control, it may be noted here that 
propaganda is created with the intent of controlling the reader either in beliefs or 
emotions, so that the consumer of propaganda is the one being controlled! Both fraud 
and propaganda involve deliberate deception by disguising falsehoods as facts with the 
 74 
purpose of tricking readers. As such, neither fraud nor propaganda is ever self-
identified as such. As with errors, stupidity, and folly, it remains for the information 
consumer to discover them.   
To review, we have identified several categories of nonknowledge standing as 
counterpoints to data, information, knowledge, and wisdom. Although we can conceive 
of an antithesis to each term in the DIKW hierarchy, the opposites of data, information, 
knowledge, and wisdom do not form a pyramid.  It is not the case that the opposite of 
data leads to the opposite of information, etc.  But there is no real reason to expect such 
a sequence. The purpose of the exercise is to develop a comprehensive concept of 
nonknowledge that can then be broken down into phases or facets that interconnect. 
Data, information, knowledge, and wisdom provide terms that help us generate a 
classification of nonknowledge.  We can also see different levels of intensity and 
consequentiality in nonknowledge. Clearly, folly is the aggravated outcome of certain 
kinds of errors. Popular misconceptions also proceed from errors in thought along with 
gullibility and deception. Meanwhile, stupidity has been identified as a maladaptive 
variety of ignorance.   
To conclude, the hierarchical way of thinking about the relations between data, 
information, knowledge, and wisdom spawned by Ackoff’s DIKW hierarchy can serve 
as an intriguing framework for considering the opposite of knowledge as a spectrum, 
and this lets us circumscribe a domain we can call nonknowledge, which posits 
opposites of each of the terms in the DIKW hierarchy. Investigation into the areas of 
stupidity, folly, errors, misinformation, and data gaps finds important connections 
between these areas, though not a perfect mirror of DIKW. Then again, it is wrong to 
assume that the DIKW model accurately reflects the stages of the development of 
knowledge, and the hierarchy itself seems due for a fresh reappraisal if not necessarily 
banishment from the canon of information science, as Martin Frické (2009) advocates.  
Even though nonknowledge cannot be decomposed into a strictly ranked order of levels 
it is still possible for us to discern a hierarchy from simple to complex, entrenched, and 
aggravated modes of nonknowledge. Nonknowledge is part of the world we live in, and 
it presents special challenges in knowledge organization, particularly in differentiating 
nonknowledge as a topic and as a form. Finally, by revealing these interconnections, 
we see the potential for nonknowledge studies to further examine problems within the 
compass of nonknowledge. 
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